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An investigation of individual preferences:  
consistency across incentives and stability over time 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Economists have used discrete choice experiments (DCEs) to elicit individual 
preferences for a number of non-market goods and services, including public 
transportation systems, environmental policy, health care services and marketing 
(Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985; Truong and Hensher, 1985; Hanley et al., 1998; 
Swait and Adamowicz, 2001; Ryan et al., 2008). DCEs are founded upon 
consumer (Lancaster, 1966) and random utility theory (McFadden, 1974) and 
postulate that utility is not derived from the consumption of a good per se, but 
from the characteristics of this good. Individuals are presented with alternative 
scenarios and asked to indicate their preferred one. Each alternative is described 
by a defined set of attributes. The attributes are common across the alternatives 
but the values they take on can differ. Using principles of experimental design to 
systematically vary the levels of the attributes across alternatives, the trade-offs 
between attributes and their relative importance in people’s decision making can 
be elicited. 
Although DCEs have firm roots theoretically, some skepticism has been 
generated in relation to some methodological aspects of the design and 
implementation of choice experiments. Commonly, DCEs evaluate individuals’ 
preferences based on responses to hypothetical questions with no direct 
consequences for respondents or anyone else. However, such lack of saliency in 
the experiment might be a cause for concern as responses to hypothetical 
scenarios may overestimate real preferences and willingness to pay values 
2 
 
(WTPs). 1 To-date the results from the literature are mixed, with one study 
(Carlsson and Martinsson, 2001) reporting no bias, while others find either partial 
(i.e. difference in WTPs but not underlying preferences) (Cameron et al., 2002; , 
List et al., 2006) or full bias (Taylor et al., 2010; Broadbent et al., 2008; Ready et 
al., 2010).  
 
A second aspect of DCEs that has come under criticism relates to the assumption 
of stability of preferences in repeated elicitation. The underlying assumption is 
that individuals can consistently reveal their well-defined preferences when asked 
repeatedly without significant variations (Stigler and Becker, 1977). This is not to 
question individuals’ time preference or preference change as a result of 
following external cues but to test whether individuals facing the same choice at 
different points in time will express the same preference. Despite its importance, 
this issue has received only minimum attention, with a couple of studies (in 
hypothetical environments) reporting no significant biases (San Miguel et al., 
2002; Ryan and San Miguel, 2003).  
 
This paper examines both the existence of hypothetical bias and the stability of 
preferences and two main features distinguish it from previous literature. First, 
our novel experimental design with both within- and between-subject treatments 
allows us to test for hypothetical bias both across incentives and over time, as 
well as, to test the stability of individual preferences. Specifically, the same 
experiment was conducted in two different environments using a between-subject 
design. The first was a hypothetical environment in which subjects’ decisions had 
                                                          
1
 Hypothetical bias problems have been raised in related non-market valuation instruments, 
namely contingent valuation, for a while now (Cummings et al., 1995; List, 2001; Blumenschein 
et al., 2008). Recent studies reviewing the literature report that hypothetical preferences overstate 
real preferences by 2.6 (Murphy et al. 2005) to 3 times (List and Gallet, 2001; Little and Berrens, 
2004). 
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no financial consequences and the second was a real environment in which 
subjects were given monetary incentives (in Canadian dollars) and asked to 
participate in the same exercise. The difference in choices between the two 
environments reflects hypothetical bias. The same treatments (both hypothetical 
and real) were also repeated, with the same subjects, a week later to test for 
stability of preferences and potential changes in the direction and magnitude of 
hypothetical bias over time (i.e. a within-subject design). Second, we measure the 
degree of internal consistency of preferences by having a choice set repeated three 
times in more or less equally spaced intervals within each treatment. We, 
subsequently, test for differences in the degree of internal consistency across 
treatments.  
 
Briefly, our analysis provides several important results. We find individual 
preferences and WTPs to be relatively stable over time but there are significant 
differences between hypothetical and real incentive treatments. Neither 
hypothetical bias nor instability is observed when measuring the degree of 
internal consistency of preferences. Section 2, discusses the experimental settings, 
tests and econometric analysis. Section 3 presents the results, while Section 4 
discusses the findings and concludes. 
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1 Experimental treatments and procedures 
 
In order to test for the consistency of preferences across incentives and over time 
we employ a 2x2 design with hypothetical versus real environment defining one 
dimension and first versus second time play defining the other (see Graph 1). Four 
treatments H1 (hypothetical first time play), R1 (real first time play), H2 
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(hypothetical second time play), and R2 (real second time play) were conducted. 
A total of 71 subjects from a Canadian university participated in three H1 and 
three R1 sessions. A week later 61 out of 71 subjects returned and participated in 
another three H2 and three R2 sessions. There were 9 to 12 subjects in each of the 
twelve sessions. Subjects who participated in H1 (R1) sessions also participated in 
H2 (R2) sessions. It was clearly stated in the recruiting email that subjects were 
required to return exactly one week later and participate again at the same time if 
they chose to participate in the experiment 2, which was instrumental for the 
within subjects treatment aspect of the design. However, to avoid any potential 
strategic answering (i.e. striving to be consistent to what they answered last time), 
participants were not told they would be playing the exact same experiment in the 
repeated session. Despite the fact that subjects would be able to recognize the 
similarities in the format and context of the two instances, strategic answering 
should not be a problem for the experiment as it would be virtually impossible to 
remember prior choices.  
 
The computerized sessions were run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Each 
session lasted about 15 minutes. At the beginning of each session subjects were 
given audio instructions, completed a practice round, and then proceeded to 
complete 24 charitable donation decisions. In each of these 24 decisions subjects 
were given a $12 endowment and asked whether they were willing to donate pre-
specified amounts to a health charity, a social service charity or to not donate at 
all (for more details see Section 2.2). Subjects were told that one of their choice 
decisions would be randomly selected at the end of the experiment and the 
donation specified for their chosen alternative would be deducted from their 
endowments and donated to the charity, while they would receive the remaining 
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 For the second-time session each subject was seated in the same computer as the first time 
session. 
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amount of their endowment. In the hypothetical treatments, all decisions 
involving money were hypothetical and no donations were made. In the real 
treatments, subjects earned the portion of the endowments that were not donated. 
To ensure the credibility of donations, subjects were informed that after each 
session one of the experimenters would carry out the donation online in front of 
them. All subjects were paid a flat fee of $12 ($6 for each of the two sessions) for 
participation. 
 
2.2 Choice experimental context, attributes and levels 
 
The choice experiment involved charitable donation decisions. Such environment 
was deemed realistic enough for a choice experiment and complex enough to 
approximate common stated preferences experiments. Most importantly, it was an 
environment that could facilitate both hypothetical and real treatments with no 
change in the design or presentation apart from the saliency of payments. Each 
alternative was described by three characteristics: the type of the charity, the 
matching policy and the donation amount.  
 
Type of Charity: Charities were identified as either a health or a social service 
charity according to their official mission and purpose. Health charities served 
causes directly linked to a health issue, while Social Service charities targeted a 
social. 3 Additionally, subjects were informed that all charities provided 
nationwide services and were comparable in terms of the percentage of funding 
                                                          
3
 Health charities: Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada, Muscular Dystrophy Canada. Social 
service charities: Opportunity International Canada and Boys and Girls Clubs of Canada. 
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received from the government (45%-55%) and the percentage of funds spent on 
administrative/managerial purposes (40%-60%). 4  
 
Matching Policy: The matching policy indicated the percentage by which 
subjects’ donations would be matched by the experimenters and took three levels:  
0%, 25% and 50%.  
 
Amount Donated: The donation amount was the dollar amount that subjects were 
asked to donate within a choice scenario. This could be $4, $8 or $12. These 
values were deemed to be large enough to create saliency and to elicit truthful 
behavior for the individuals.   
An example of the exact language and instructions of the experiment is given in 
Appendix 1.    
 
2.3 DCE experimental design 
 
Absorbing the type of charity as a label in the choice experiment allows for the 
estimation of type-of-charity specific effects (i.e. separate parameters estimated 
for health and social charities). A D-efficient fractional factorial labelled design 
with two three-level attributes was generated (LMA = 32*2), which consisted of 21 
pair-wise choices. To ensure elicitation of realistic behaviors an opt-out 
alternative (i.e., an individual does not donate and keeps the full endowment) was 
included in the choice sets (Hensher et al., 2005). An extra choice set was also 
added and repeated three times throughout the experiment, in equally spaced 
intervals, to allow measurement of the degree of internal validity with which 
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 To ensure well-defined preferences (or at least well-informed choices), participants in the current 
study were given information on the charities’ background characteristics, purpose and official 
mission, which information was accessible at all times during the experiment. 
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subjects responded5, bringing the total number of choice sets subjects saw to 24. 
All aspects of the experimental design were performed using SAS 9.1.3 built-in 
capabilities (Kuhfeld, 2005). 
 
2.4 Testing consistency and stability 
 
The three main research questions are:  
 
1. Does hypothetical bias exist in individual decisions in choice 
experiments? If yes, what is the direction and magnitude of the bias?  
2. Can individual preferences be consistently revealed in repeated 
elicitation settings (i.e. stability of the preference) and if no, do they 
also result in changes in the direction and magnitude of hypothetical 
bias?  
3. Do individuals make the same decision over identical choice sets in a 
DCE within the same treatment? Does the degree of internal validity 
differ across incentives and over time?   
 
To address these questions five tests are conducted. 
Test 1 - The same model specification is run for all four treatments and equality 
of underlying preferences is tested with LR-tests (the econometric model 
estimated are discussed in Section 2.5; results reported in Tables 1 and 2).  
 
Test 2 - Following estimation, WTP values are calculated and comparisons across 
treatments are drawn using t-tests (results reported in Tables 1 and 2).  
 
                                                          
5
 Choice sets 4, 12 and 21 were identical. These three choice sets were added to the 21 of the DCE 
experimental design 
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Test 3 – Having a thrice repeated choice set, internal validity of individual 
preferences in completing a DCE within each treatment, was measured by the 
number of times the individual did, in fact, choose the same alternative in all three 
instances (an individual with well-defined, consistent preferences would be 
expected to prefer the same alternative in all three repetitions). The internal 
validity indicator takes the value of zero if an individual’s choices match in none 
of the three choice sets, the value of one if two out of the three choices match and 
the value of two if all three choices are identical. The distribution of this variable 
is compared across treatments using a Pearson Ȥ 2 statistic, testing the hypothesis 
that the rows and columns in a frequency table are independent. Failing to reject 
the hypothesis implies homogeneous distributions across the treatments, i.e., 
internal validity is, on average, similar when playing in real or hypothetical 
treatments and for the first or second time played (results reported in Table 4).  
 
Test 4 and Test 5 are facilitated by the fact that we are able to match the 
individuals’ responses from the first and the second time they completed the 
experiment (i.e. similar to a panel data structure).  
 
Test 4 - We compare the degree of internal validity (measured in Test 3) an 
individual displays when playing for the first time with the corresponding internal 
validity when they play for the second time. Hence, a new stability variable is 
created that takes the value of one when the individual displays the same degree 
of internal validity on both times they play and zero otherwise. A 
Pearson Ȥ 2 statistic is used to test whether the stability variable values are the 
same between real treatments and hypothetical treatments (the results are reported 
in Table 5).   
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Test 5 - We compare each individual’s decision in each choice set in the first time 
play with the corresponding choice in the second time played. Again, we would 
expect an individual who exhibits well-defined preferences to give identical 
answers in the two time periods. Hence, this allows for the creation of another 
stability score taking values from zero (if no choice from period one matches the 
corresponding choice from period two) to 24 (if all choices match). In addition to 
using a Pearson Ȥ 2 statistic, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test formally tests for 
differences in the distributions of the stability scores between real and 
hypothetical treatments (results reported in Table 6). 
 
2.5 Estimation models for the choice experimental data 
 
For the analysis a semi-parametric latent-class model (LCM) (Greene and 
Hensher, 2003) is used, where individuals are probabilistically sorted into classes 
following a multinomial distribution (Greene and Hensher, 2003). Within each 
class a conditional logit is fitted (McFadden, 1974). The LCM avoids problems 
often associated with the standard conditional logit model (i.e. restrictive IIA, 
ignoring panel nature of data, ignoring preference heterogeneity) and presents an 
intuitive and easily interpretable alternative. The number of latent classes is 
determined a priori, based on the performance of different models with respect to 
information criteria, i.e. BIC (Swait and Adamowicz, 2001). Following estimation 
and using the cost attribute (i.e. monetary donation) as a numéraire, average WTP 
values for the attributes can be obtained. 
  
3. Results  
 
A total of 71 university students participated in the experiment: 35 for H1 and 36 
for R1. Of those 30 returned for H2 and 31 for R2. In the real sessions subjects 
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earned about $16 on average (out of possible $24 for playing twice and in 
addition to the $12 flat fees) and a total amount of $353 was donated to charities. 
The LCM outperformed the conditional logit, while convergence was achieved 
for all estimations only when two latent classes. 6 Interestingly, none of the 
demographics significantly affected the class probabilities and hence they were 
dropped from the analysis.7 
 
Before proceeding with the hypothetical bias and preference stability results we 
will briefly discuss the interpretation of the H1 model to familiarise the reader 
with inference from choice models. Estimated coefficients depict part-worth 
utilities, with a positive coefficient implying an increase in the alternative’s 
attractiveness (i.e. bringing higher utility) as the attribute’s level increases. Hence, 
in Class 1, from the constants, we find a preference for health charities relative to 
a social charity. All other attributes possess a positive sign implying that as the 
percentage of matching increases or as the amount to donate required increases, 
the probability of choosing such charity increases. 8 The counter-intuitive nature 
of the contribution attributes (which is in contrast with the marginal disutility of 
increasing price that would be expected a priori) will be briefly discussed later. 
Turning to Class 2, contribution attributes display the expected negative signs 
confirming the disutility associated with increasing cost, whereas matching is as 
before increasing in utility.  
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 For models that converged with three classes, the results of the second and third classes were 
largely comparable. 
7
 Insignificant demographic effects are common in such models, e.g. Hanley et al. (2005). 
8
 Only the sign and the relative importance of the raw coefficients within each model can be 
interpreted. The size of the raw coefficients cannot be interpreted directly and cannot be compared 
across models. WTPs can be used for this.  
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Although the latent nature of the model does not make known which participant 
falls in which class we can estimate the size of such class probabilities, with Class 
2 being more likely with 63% relative to 37% of Class 1. 
 
Moving away from the raw coefficients, the WTP column of the H1 model 
presents the willingness-to-donate values for each class. WTP values themselves 
indicate the amount of money by which a subject increases/decreases their 
donation for a percentage increase in the matching policy. For Class 1, on 
average, individuals imply a reduction in their willingness-to-donate by $0.08 and 
$0.07 for the health and social charities, respectively, for every unitary increase in 
the matching percentage (i.e. going from 1% to 2% matching policy), whereas 
matching has the opposite effect for Class 2, with the corresponding WTPs 
indicating a willingness to increase donations by $0.29 and $0.41 for health and 
social charities, respectively. 
 
3.1 Results for Test 1 
 
We first estimate parameters using the latent class model (Table 1). We regress 
the probability of choosing an alternative on the level of matching percentage 
(Matching Health, Matching Social), the amount to donate (Contribution Health, 
Contribution Social), the dummy variable which equals to 1 if health charity is 
chosen (i.e., Donate to Health Charity) and the dummy variable which equals to 1 
if the opt out option is chosen (i.e., Do Not Donate). We then test for equality of 
parameters across treatments using LR tests and allowing for scaling differences 
(Swait and Louviere, 1993). Equality of parameters is rejected when comparing 
treatments H1 and R1 and treatments H2 and R2, suggesting evidence of 
hypothetical bias. Comparing treatments H1 and H2 we are unable to reject the 
null hypothesis that the parameters are not different, suggesting stability of 
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preferences in repeated elicitation. However, such stability is rejected when 
comparing treatments R1 and R2 (failing to reject only at higher than 
conventional significance levels, i.e. 1‰).   
 
3.2 Results for Test 2 
 
We compare WTPs across models and classes. WTPs are given in the second 
column of each treatment in Table 1, while Table 3 presents t-test values for all 
possible pair-wise comparisons. Those playing with real incentives are less 
responsive to changes in the matching policy (4 out of 8 t-tests indicate significant 
differences), while such difference are minimised when comparing subjects 
between first and second time played (none out of 8 t-tests is significant). 
Specifically, for Class 1, comparing hypothetical and real treatments we find a 
crowding-out effect which is more pronounced for those playing for real stakes 
(e.g. WTPR1=-0.57 vs WTPH1=-0.07), implying that subjects playing for real tend 
to reduce their donation for every increase in the matching by more than 8 times 
the reduction observed in those playing hypothetically. For Class 2, comparing 
hypothetical and real treatments, we find that matching induces donation but this 
donation is much smaller in the real treatment. Subjects in the real treatments tend 
to increase their donation by less (2 to 7 times less) for every percentage increase 
in matching compared to the subjects in the hypothetical treatments.  
 
3.3 Results for Test 3, Test 3 and Test 5 
 
Tests 3 to 5 are feasible due to the fact that the same choice set is repeated three 
times for each individual. These tests are not testing differences in the choice 
experiment estimations (parameters or preferences) but rather the internal validity 
in completing the DCE across treatments and the intertemporal stability of such 
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internal validity across incentives. Tables 4, 5 and 6 present the results. In 
general, we find that subjects do not display varying degrees of internal validity 
according to the treatment they were assigned to or between the two times they 
played, i.e. the levels of observed internal validity in the choice experiments were 
the same for all four of our treatments. None of the Ȥ 2  tests detect any 
significant differences, while a Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic confirms the lack 
of systematic differences between the distributions of the stability scores (D = 
0.2903, p-value = 0.153).   
 
Acknowledging the potential biases in testing for the stability of preferences over 
time when including in the analysis subjects who participated in the “1st time” but 
did not participate in the “2nd time” of each treatment we repeat the analyses 
excluding such participants (5 from treatment H1 and 5 from R1). 9 Results 
indicate little difference from the full sample with the constants in Class 1 now 
becoming insignificant as does contribution for social charity across four 
treatments, whereas the findings from the LR-tests and other tests remain 
unchanged.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
We examine consistency of individual preferences across incentives (i.e. 
hypothetical bias) and their stability in repeated elicitation in a choice experiment 
involving decision to make charitable contributions within a controlled laboratory 
setting. We provide some evidence of hypothetical bias based on the underlying 
preferences and the derived WTP (or more correctly willingness-to-donate) 
values. On the other hand, we find partial support for instability, with preferences 
                                                          
9The potential biases are only related to Tests 1, 2 and 3, as for Tests 4 and 5 which required the 
panel aspect of our design such subjects were excluded anyway. 
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being unstable for the incentivised treatments but with WTP values stable across 
both hypothetical and real environments.  
 
In particular, looking at the equality of parameters across models we find 
significant differences between first time and second time of play in the real 
treatments but no difference for the hypothetical treatments or any of the WTP 
values (real or hypothetical). Two distinct preference patterns emerge from our 
sample. For some subjects, matching policy increases donations with the effect 
being smaller for real than hypothetical scenarios, while for others a crowding-out 
effect is observed with the effect being more pronounced for those playing with 
real incentives.  
 
Finally, neither hypothetical bias nor time instability is observed when we focus 
on the degree of internal validity in completing the choice experiment elicited 
from a thrice repeated choice set.  
 
Hence, contrary to past literature, we observe a more persistent presence of 
hypothetical bias irrespective of the testing method (List et al., 2006; Lusk and 
Schroeder, 2004), while we partially confirm past findings in relation to the 
stability of preference over time (San Miguel et al., 2002). 
 
Regarding the theoretical validity of our substantive results, our findings are 
consistent with past experimental findings on the observed heterogeneity in 
people’s pro-social preferences (Anderoni and Vesterlund, 2001). The positive 
signs for contribution (and subsequent negative WTPs given increases in the 
matching rate) can be attributed to pure altruism (a preference for other’s well-
being), warm glow (a pleasurable feeling from giving) or impure altruism (a 
combination of pure altruism and warm glow) (Anderoni 1989, 1990), while the 
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negative WTPs to a motivational crowding-out effect, where the amount 
experimenters matched may be perceived as reducing in self-determination or as 
controlling and undermining the intrinsic motivation of giving (Deci and Ryan, 
1985; Frey, 1997). However, thorough analysis and discussion of the issue is 
beyond the scope of this paper.   
 
As a general remark, despite acknowledging potential limitations in the 
representativeness and generalisation of our small samples, this study has shown 
the presence of strong hypothetical bias in choice experiments but less problems 
of time instability of preferences. Caution is suggested in drawing inferences from 
hypothetical DCEs, while their implementation should particularly focus on 
enhancing the realism of the question and its context. In addition to contributing 
to the emerging literature of the external and internal validity of choice 
experiments, this paper further demonstrates that choice experiments can be a 
useful tool in examining charitable donations decisions, especially in 
disentangling income and substitution effects, although it leaves more in depth 
examination of the issue to future research.  
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Graph 1. Experimental Design and Treatment Labels 
 
2x2 Design 
Between-Subject  
Design  
 
 
Hypothetical 
Incentive 
Real     
Incentive 
Within-Subject 
Design First-time play H1  R1 
 Second-time play H2 R2 
 
 
Note: Internal validity is measured in every treatment 
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Table 1. Latent Class model estimations and willingness-to-pay calculation by treatment. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Hypothetical, 1st time (H1)  Real, 1st time (R1)  Hypothetical, 2nd time (H2)  Real, 2nd time (R2) 
 Coeff. WTP . Coeff. WTP . Coeff. WTP . Coeff. WTP 
Class 1            
Donate to Health Charity 1.421**   1.003**   0.435   0.963  
 (0.703)   (0.498)   (0.978)   (0.727)  
Do not donate 0.221   0.587   1.607*   0.134  
 (0.686)   (0.363)   (0.906)   (0.521)  
Matching Health  0.014* -0.0821*  0.046*** 21.3610  0.055*** -0.1553***  0.038*** -1.4888 
 (0.008) (0.045)  (0.006) (334.0)  (0.013) (0.032)  (0.006) (2.22) 
Contribution Health 0.17***   -0.002   0.353***   0.025  
 (0.054)   (0.034)   (0.087)   (0.038)  
Matching Social 0.022*** -0.0671**  0.058*** -0.5737***  0.047*** -0.0940***  0.04*** -0.2544*** 
 (0.008) (0.026)  (0.006) (0.209)  (0.011) (0.0247)  (0.008) (0.095) 
Contribution Social  0.326***   0.100***   0.504***   0.155***  
 (0.054)   (0.035)   (0.081)   (0.048)  
Class 2            
Donate to Health Charity 0.299   -0.273   0.452   -0.305  
 (0.359)   (0.756)   (0.437)   (0.626)  
Do not donate -0.17   0.393   -0.112   -1.008**  
 (0.198)   (0.417)   (0.265)   (0.444)  
Matching Health  0.042*** 0.2905***  0.052*** 0.1532***  0.062*** 0.3133***  0.044*** 0.0844*** 
 (0.003) (0.0603)  (0.009) (0.035)  (0.004) (0.0467)  (0.008) (0.017) 
Contribution Health -0.146***   -0.338***   -0.198***   -0.521***  
 (0.03)   (0.053)   (0.028)   (0.067)  
Matching Social 0.035*** 0.4068***  0.031*** 0.1199***  0.051*** 0.4737***  0.041*** 0.0682*** 
 (0.004) (0.103)  (0.008) (0.035)  (0.005) (0.127)  (0.009) (0.0147) 
Contribution Social  -0.086***   -0.255***   -0.107***   -0.594***  
 (0.023)   (0.048)   (0.028)   (0.079)  
            
Prob. of Class 1 0.369   0.668   0.341   0.259  
Prob. of Class 2 0.631   0.332   0.659   0.741  
# of subjects 35   36   30   31  
BIC  1.79   1.62   1.55   1.42  
 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Donate to Health Charity and Not donate are alternative specific constants, where the vase category is  Donate to Social Charity. Such constants capture differences in utility 
based solely on the type of charity. 
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Table 2. Likelihood ratio tests for equality of model parameters across models 
  . 
Sum  
LL Model 1 + 
LL Model 2 
. 
Sum  
LL Model 3 + 
LL Model 4 
. 
Sum  
LL Model 1 + 
LL Model 3 
. 
Sum  
LL Model 2 + 
LL Model 4 
. 
LR test:  
2*( LL Sum – LL Pooled) 
LL Model 1: Hyp, 1st -615.741           
LL Model 2: Real 1st -570.325           
LL Model 3: Hyp, 2nd  -446.510           
LL Model 4: Real, 2nd -419.135           
LL Pooled Model 1 & 2 a 
-1209.4  -1186.066        46.66 
LL Pooled Model 3 & 4 a 
-922.078    -865.645      112.86 
LL Pooled Model 1 & 3 b 
-1065.510      -1062.251    6.51 
LL Pooled Model 2 & 4 b 
-1005.760        -989.460  32.59 
 
Critical value for Ȥ2 statistic at 5% =23.69, 1%=29.14, 1‰=36.12 
a Indicates test relevant to hypothetical bias (i.e. across incentives comparisons) 
b Indicates test relevant to time stability (i.e. across time comparisons) 
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Table 3. Values of the t-statistics for t-test of equality of WTPs across models/samples and classes 
 
(H1)WTP 
HealthC1 
(H1)WTP 
SocialC1 
(H1)WTP 
HealthC2 
(H1)WTP 
SocialC2 
(R1)WTP 
HealthC1 
(R1)WTP 
SocialC1 
(R1)WTP 
HealthC2 
(R1)WTP 
SocialC2 
(H2)WTP 
HealthC1 
(H2)WTP 
SocialC1 
(H2)WTP 
HealthC2 
(H2)WTP 
SocialC2 
(R1) WTP Health C1 0.064 a 0.064 0.063 0.063 0.000        
(R1) WTP Social C1 -2.300 -2.406 a -3.973 -4.209 -0.066 0.000       
(R1) WTP Health C2 4.127 5.053 -1.969 a -2.331 -0.063 3.431 0.000      
(R1) WTP Social C2 3.543 4.289 -2.447 -2.637 a -0.064 3.274 -0.673 0.000     
(H2) WTP Health C1 -1.326 b -2.139 -6.530 -5.212 -0.064 1.979 -6.505 -5.803 0.000    
(H2) WTP Social C1 -0.232 -0.750 b -5.901 -4.728 -0.064 2.280 -5.771 -4.993 1.516 0.000   
(H2) WTP Health C2 6.097 7.117 0.299 b -0.827 -0.063 4.142 2.743 3.314 8.277 7.710 0.000  
(H2) WTP Social C2 4.125 4.172 1.303 0.409 b -0.063 4.283 2.433 2.686 4.803 4.388 1.185 0.000 
(R2) WTP Health C1 -0.634 -0.640 -0.801 -0.853 -0.068 b -0.410 -0.740 -0.725 -0.601 a -0.628 -0.812 -0.883 
(R2) WTP Social C1 -1.639 -1.902 -4.843 -4.719 -0.065 1.391 b -4.026 -3.697 -0.989 -1.634 a -5.363 -4.591 
(R2) WTP Health C2 3.461 4.877 -3.290 -3.088 -0.064 3.139 -1.768 b -0.912 6.615 5.950 -4.606 a -3.038 
(R2) WTP Social C2 3.175 4.530 -3.582 -3.254 -0.064 3.064 -2.239 -1.362 b 6.347 5.643 -5.006 -3.172 a 
 
The letters in parentheses at the beginning of the names indicate treatments of the WTP value tested, while the “C1” or “C2” at the end indicates whether it corresponds to the first 
or second class of the LCM.  
 
a Indicates t-test values relevant to hypothetical bias (i.e. across incentives comparisons) 
b Indicates t-test values relevant to time stability (i.e. across time comparisons) 
  Numbers in italic indicate significance at 5% 
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Table 4. Ȥ 2 tests of degree of internal validity across treatmentsa  
Internal validity measure values  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 . Hypothetical, 1st time . Real, 1st time . Hypothetical, 2nd time . Real, 2nd time 
0  0  1  1  0 
1  11  12  9  6 
2  24  23  20  25 
# of subjects  35  36  30  31 
         
Hypothetical bias tests         
 (H1) vs. (R1)  Ȥ 2 = 1.05     
 (H2) vs. (R2)  Ȥ 2 = 2.14     
Time stability tests         
 (H1) vs. (H2)  Ȥ 2 = 1.19     
 (R1) vs. (R2)  Ȥ 2 = 2.72     
 
a  Internal  validity is based on comparison of choices across three repetitions of a choice set (i.e. consistency in completing the DCE)  
Critical value for Ȥ 2 = 5.99 
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Table 5. Ȥ 2 tests for the stability measure across incentivesa  
Stability measure values 
 
Real . Hypothetical . Ȥ 2 test for stability of preference between  
Real treatments vs. Hypothetical treatments 
0  13  11   
1  18  19   
# of subjects  31  30   
 
 
    Ȥ 2 = 0.177 
 
a
 Stability is based on the individuals’ degree of internal validity displayed in the two times they played. 
Critical value for Ȥ 2 = 3.841 
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Table 6. Ȥ 2 tests for the stability of answers in each choice set between the two times of play across incentives  
Stability score . Real . Hypothetical . Ȥ 2 test for stability of preference between  
Real treatments vs. Hypothetical treatments 
2  1  0   
5  1  0   
6  1  0   
7  2  0   
9  4  0   
10  1  1   
11  0  1   
12  3  2   
13  1  2   
14  1  2   
15  2  0   
16  1  2   
17  1  3   
19  2  4   
20  1  4   
21  2  3   
22  4  2   
23  0  2   
24  3  2   
# of subjects  31  30   
      Ȥ 2 = 19.72 
 
Critical value for Ȥ 2 = 28.87 
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An investigation of individual preferences: consistency across incentives and 
stability over time 
 
Appendix 
 
Instructions (Individual Treatment—REAL SESSIONS) 
 
Introduction 
 
This survey is concerned with charitable donating decisions, i.e. how much to donate and to which 
type of charity. We are interested in gaining an understanding of the relative importance 
individuals place on the different characteristics of a charity in the donation decision. 
  
There are two parts to this survey. In Part I you are asked to make 24 donating decisions and for 
each one you are given an initial monetary endowment of $12. You are then presented with the 
option to donate a fraction of your endowment to one of two charities or to not donate to either 
charity. Part II asks you for some basic demographic information to help us analyze the data from 
the survey. This information will not be used in any way to identify you. For Part II you will be 
compensated a flat fee of $6. 
 
Completing the survey should take somewhere between 15 and 30 minutes. 
 
Charity and Scenario description 
 
Each charity is described by three characteristics: 1) the type of the charity (social service or 
health); 2) the matching policy (0%, 25%, 50%); and 3) the amount to donate ($4, $8, $12).  
 
(1) Type of Charity:  
 
Each charity is identified as either a Health or a Social Service charity according to the mission 
and the purpose of the charity.  
 
x Health charities imply serving causes that are directly linked to some health issue 
(e.g. Cardiovascular diseases, Muscular Dystrophy).  
 
x Social Service charities target causes that deal with some social issue (e.g. Poverty, 
Support for youth and families at risk) 
 
The charities that have been chosen are comparable in terms of the percentage of funding received 
from the government (45%-55%) and the percentage of funds spent on administrative/managerial 
purposes (40%-60%). Two Health charities and two Social Service charities are identified. All 
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charities provide nationwide services. More details about the exact causes and missions of each 
charity are given on separate sheets on your desk. This information comes directly from the web 
pages of the charities. 
 
(2) Matching Policy:  
 
For each charity, you will also be presented with our matching policy. This policy 
indicates the percentage with which we will match your donations. If you donate $8 (out 
of your initial endowment of $12) to a charity with a matching policy of 25%, we will 
automatically add $8*25%=$2 to your donation. Hence, the total amount that will be 
donated to the charity will be $2+$8=$10. If you donate $8 with a matching policy of 
50%, we will automatically add $8*50%=$4 to your donation for a total of $4+$8=$12.  
 
There are three levels of matching policies: 
  
x 0% 
x 25% 
x 50% 
 
(3) Amount Donated  
 
Donations can be made in three different amounts:  
 
x $4 
x $8 
x $12 
 
Payments and Online Donations 
 
When you start the survey, you will be, sequentially, asked to make 24 donating 
decisions/scenarios. In each of these 24 scenarios you will be given a $12 endowment and asked 
how much you are willing to donate to a Health charity, or a Social Service charity or not to 
donate at all. At the end of your 24 decisions, one of these decisions will be randomly chosen for 
calculating your payment. 
 
The first two options (i.e. donate to Health or Social Service charity) will each have a donation of 
$4, $8 or $12 to be deducted from your endowment of $12, while the third option (i.e. No 
Donation) requires no dollar donation and you will keep all $12.  
 
Hence:  
 
x If you chose the third option (i.e. No Donation), you will be given $12 and 
no money will be donated to the charities.  
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x If you have chosen either of the other two options, we will deduct the 
donation amount from your endowed $12 and you will keep the rest. We 
will then match your donation according to the matching policy, add it up to 
your donation and the sum will be donated to a charity in the specified 
category (social or health). 
  
If you have chosen a Health charity, the donations will be sent to one of the two Health charities 
that are described on the separate sheets. The specific charity is chosen at random and will be the 
same for all people in your session.  
 
If you have chosen a Social Service charity, the donations will be sent to one of the two Social 
Service charities that are described on the separate sheets. The specific charity is chosen at random 
and will be the same for all people in your session. 
 
Once the donated amounts are determined and calculated and the charity is randomly drawn, one 
of the experimenters will carry out the donation online in front of you. No one will be claiming a 
charitable donation tax credit.  
 
 
 
PART I 
 
In this part you are presented with 24 donating decisions. You start with a new endowment of $12 
in each scenario. Your decision in one scenario should not affect your decision in another 
scenario. 
 
In each scenario you will be asked to choose between donating to a Health charity, donating to a 
Social Service charity or no donation.  
 
All aspects of the charities apart from those presented should be assumed identical.  
 
THERE ARE NO RIGHT OR WRONG ANSWERS.  
 
We are interested in your donation decisions. 
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Example  
 
 
 In the example above, option B has been selected. Therefore, the individual has chosen to donate 
$4 of his $12 endowment to a Social Service charity with a matching policy of 50%. Hence if this 
scenario is randomly drawn for payment, the individual will receive $8 and the charity will receive 
$6 (i.e. $4 + (50%*$4)).  
 
Are there any questions? 
 
In the section below, we will start with a practice round, followed by 24 donating decisions. In 
each case please indicate whether you prefer Option A, B or C by placing a tick in the appropriate 
radio button and then click “Submit”. 
 
